

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

May 23, 2023



FOIPA Request No.: 1578262-000

Subject: SCHICK, BELA

Dear Mr. Scheer:

The FBI has completed its review of records subject to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) that are responsive to your request. The enclosed documents were reviewed under the FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

	Section 552	Section 552a
(b)(1)	(b)(7)(A)	(d)(5)
(b)(2)	(b)(7)(B)	□ (j)(2)
(b)(3)	✓ (b)(7)(C)	□ (k)(1)
	(b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
	✓ (b)(7)(E)	(k)(3)
	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
(b)(4)	(b)(8)	(k)(5)
(b)(5)	(b)(9)	□ (k)(6)
(b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

2 pages were reviewed and 2 pages are being released.

Please see the paragraphs below for relevant information specific to your request as well as the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for standard responses applicable to all requests.

Based on the information you provided, we conducted a main and reference entity record search of the Central Records System (CRS) per our standard search policy. For more information about records searches and the standard search policy, see the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum General Information Section.

This is the **final release** of information responsive to your FOIPA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

Enclosed are cross-references that are identifiable with the subject of your request. Cross-references are defined as mentions of the subject of your request in files to other individuals, organizations, events, or activities. In processing the cross-references, the pages considered for possible release included only those pages that mention the subject of your request and any additional pages showing the context in which the subject of your request was mentioned.

Records that may have been responsive to your request were destroyed. Since this material could not be reviewed, it is not known if it was responsive to your request. Record retention and disposal is carried out under supervision of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Title 44, United States Code, Section 3301 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1228; Title 44, United States Code, Section 3310 as implemented by Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229.10.

Records that may be responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request have been transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). If you wish to review these records, submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to NARA, Special Access and FOIA, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500, College Park, MD 20740-6001. Please reference file numbers:

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100-HQ-239886 Ser 28 p 3
100-HQ-239886-A
100-HQ-350512 Ser 506
100-HQ-356137 Ser 715, 236, 661, 846
100-HQ-7046 Ser 192
100-HQ-7046 Ser 2617
100-HQ-7046 Ser 336
100-HQ-7046-A
100-HQ-363491 Ser 64
100-HQ-7061 Ser 1589
100-HQ-15252 Ser 39, encl p 437
100-HQ-99898 Ser 132 encl p 4, Ser 151 encl p 19, ser 24
100-HQ-7058 Ser 62, 64
100-HQ-99899 Ser 30 p 5
100-HQ-23331 Ser 18 p 1
100-HQ-361220 Ser 4, 3
100-HQ-47852 Ser 17
100-HQ-212169 Ser 181
100-HQ-206852 Ser 37
121-HQ-19160 Ser 20
100-HQ-368192 Ser 3
100-HQ-350264 Ser 1183
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Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. "Part 1" of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. "Part 2" includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. "Part 3" includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

Joseph E. Bender, Jr. Acting Section Chief

Japh E. Banduf

Record/Information Dissemination Section Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

- (i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.
- (ii) Intelligence Records. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

- (i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.
- (ii) Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.
- (iii) Requests for Confidential Informant Records. The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C.§ § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C.§ 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

- (i) Record Searches and Standard Search Policy. The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.
 - a. *Main Entity Records* created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
 - b. Reference Entity Records- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation
- (ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.
- (iii) **Foreseable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.
- (iv) Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets. The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.edo.cjis.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence:
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

In the 1915-1910 spidenic the Lindichi Santrarum. Elminost illinost heated 500 for cases without a single fatality while the Cook County hospital, just across the street from the Lindians using the regular drugging methods, for 55 patients by death out of

every 300 coses. If flu

If doctors kept people healthy, under the payfor dosing system, they'd lose 95% of their business. FEW doctors are so altruistic. They're not

in business for anybody's health.

U.S. Public Health Service reports for ten weeks, Sept. 20 to Nov. 29, 1918, showed an astonishing contrast between the flu death rate among soldiers and civilians. Of 1,500,000 soldiers, 21,994 died af flu. Of 110,000,000 civilkarrs, 350,000 died of flu-Soldier death rate. 1466 per 100,000. Civilian death rate, 318 per 100,000. Nearly 5 solidiers to one civilian. soldiers were young, carefully selected by every medical test, thoroughly "protected" against everything for which there was a serum, and they lived under constant medical supervision. The civilian population included the aged, the army rejects, the sium wrecks, and had much less "medical atten-tion", in many cases, none at all. Serum shots and medical attention killed the soldiers.

Soldiers who never left American soil, who never saw nor heard a shell explode were invalid ed home suffering from shell shock —serum shots rather. They may not have had small power tolks back home dian't either, without the protection. Before the soldier could get it he

died of SOMETHING ELSE.

Huge sums required to pay damage claims of soldiers injured by vaccines and serums have forced the British government to drop the compulsory vaccination requirements in the army, and since the "protection" has been abandoned (civilians have not been under compulsion since 1908). Dr. John E. Gordon of the Harvard Medical School reports British health "anazings" surprisingly good and "bomb shock" case are surprisingly few. (AP reports Sept 28 and Dec. (1940).

"America will be conquered from within". His

"America will be conquered from within". His ler says. This leatlet is being printed at my private

expense to prevent it if possible

Drafters - demand your rights before the locoldraft board - Con't wait to line up and be shot.

April 5, 1941.

Nell Foster Rogers, D.S.A. Route I. Comesville, Florida



BY NELL FOSTER ROGERS

Hitler says America will be conquered from within Has Germany, leader for decades in Imedical progress", been saboraging the health of the American people, as indicated by the astounding

rejection rate among young draftees?

The American Medical Association has just been convicted in U.S. Courts of being a trust. If has spread disease for the profit there is in it. It has throttled every doctor who has tried to want the public. It has duped the American people until anyone attempting to warn the public may himself be charged with sabotage, so completely has this trust sold its lies and dopes to the people. What has Hitler done, or what does he know about this terrible situation?

About 1914 when Germany set out to 'conquer the world' Bela Schick, a German from Austria, set out to spread the 'Schick test' and toxin articloxin thruout enemy countries. THE AUSTRIAN COVERNIMENT FOR BADE. THE USE OF THE TEST AND TOXIN after some of the poson had leaked thru Austrian doctors needles into Austrian subjects. Belgium and other European countries however, took the bait, and England did for a time, the Fairbrother says the use of the toxins have never become general in England. It could not be advertised in England as 'harnless' since English law prohibits an advertiser from publishing statements unless he can prove them.

But in America Schick evaded the guards who were watching for spies poisoning drinking water By playing upon the cupidity of American doctors showing them a gold mine in the Schick test and toxin anti-toxin, he got them to spread his Hellbroth thrubut America. American doctors injecting poison into American veins, for the fortune there was in it—that is sabotage as the experts do

it. Read on if you doubt it.

The Jacksonville Journal for March 25, 1941 quotes Lean G. Yranz, head of physical education at Northwestern University, as saving that the 21-2 percent election at traffees in Cook County in the 1917-18 draft period, which represented the average for the rest of the country, "greatly alarmed physical authorities and sports directors", but that after a 23 year period of great emphasis on physical education and sports, the rejection percentage today is 43. "Professor Kranz", the Journal says, "Challenges the general program now being corried aut, in the schools and collects."

That is, the Schick testing and toxin anti-

